Analytical formulas for risk assessment for a class of problems where risk depends on three interrelated variables  by Srivastava, Rajendra P. et al.
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
45 (2007) 123–151
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijarAnalytical formulas for risk assessment for a class
of problems where risk depends on three
interrelated variables
Rajendra P. Srivastava *, Theodore J. Mock, Jerry L. Turner
University of Kansas, School of Business, 1300 Sunnyside Avenue, Lawernce, KS 66045, United States
Received 4 December 2005; received in revised form 28 July 2006; accepted 31 July 2006
Available online 23 August 2006Abstract
We derive general analytical formulas for assessing risks in a problem domain where the risk
depends on three interrelated variables. More speciﬁcally, we derive general analytical formulas
for propagating beliefs in a network where three binary variables, A, B, and C, are related to a fourth
binary variable Z through an ‘AND’ relationship. In addition, we assume that variables A, B, and C
are interrelated in that a change in one variable may aﬀect the value of each of the other two. The
analytical formulas derived in this article determine the overall belief and plausibility that Z is true or
not true, given that we have beliefs on variables A, B and/or C.
To demonstrate the importance of the general results, we use the results to develop models appli-
cable to three real-world situations. The ﬁrst model can aid external auditors in assessing the quality
of an audit client’s internal audit function to determine the extent to which the internal auditor’s
work can be relied on in the conduct of a ﬁnancial audit while the second can aid in assessing the
risk of impaired auditor independence when conducting a ﬁnancial statement audit. The third model
can be used to assess the risk of management fraud in ﬁnancial reporting. Assessment of such risks is
of critical importance to external auditors, regulators, and the investing public. Analytical formulas
to help address these types of important business and economic problems have not been available
prior to these derivations.
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sment model1. Introduction
In the business world, failure to recognize and assess risks can result in signiﬁcant costs
to the public. In a ﬁnancial statement audit, for example, it is important that the auditor
assess the risk of ﬁnancial statement fraud. However, as evidenced from the many cases of
fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting, auditors face signiﬁcant challenges in assessing such risks
adequately.1 The inability to assess fraud risk adequately has cost the auditing profession
and the investing public billions of dollars. This is evidenced by the demise of one of the
world’s largest accounting and auditing ﬁrms, Arthur Andersen, and the failures of com-
panies such as Enron and WorldCom. According to Cotton [5], shareholders lost $460 bil-
lion in the ﬁve fraud cases of Enron, Global Crossing, Qwest, WorldCom, and Tyco alone.
The cost is much more if the indirect costs of fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting behaviors are
considered, such as the loss of public trust in the auditing profession and reduced conﬁ-
dence in the capital market system that is the engine of the global economy.
The auditing profession has been aware of the need to identify and assess the risk of
ﬁnancial statement fraud for some time. In 2002 the American Institute of Certiﬁed Public
Accountants (AICPA) published Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit [3], which requires a pre-audit assessment of the risk
of fraud by the independent auditor as well as a continuous assessment update as a ﬁnan-
cial statement audit progresses. This statement indicates that three conditions generally are
present when fraud occurs [3,7]:
1. management or other employees have an incentive or are under pressure which provides
a reason to commit fraud,
2. circumstances exist that provide an opportunity for a fraud to be perpetrated, such as
the absence of controls, ineﬀective controls, or the ability of management to override
existing controls, and
3. those involved are able to rationalize committing a fraudulent act.
Logically however, if any one, two, or all of these conditions are absent then fraud should
not occur. These three factors are known as ‘‘fraud triangle’’ factors [17].
The main purpose of this article is to derive general analytical formulas for assessing
risks in a problem domain where the risk depends on three interrelated variables such
as in the case of fraud. This problem context is quite general and applies to several other
important business risk-assessment contexts such as auditor independence and the quality
of the internal audit function.
For example, lack of auditor independence is a critical risk requiring assessment. Audi-
tor independence risk is deﬁned as the risk that threats to auditor independence, to the
extent that they are not mitigated by safeguards, compromise or can reasonably be1 For example, Enron, Global Crossing, Qwest, WorldCom, and Tyco. See [5] for more examples.
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ﬁnancial statements of a speciﬁc client [9]. In testimony before the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Ralph Whitworth, Managing Member, Relational Inves-
tors LLC argued that ‘‘[A]uditor independence goes to the very essence of our capital mar-
kets, and its linked inextricably to the eﬃciencies of our capitalist system’’ [18]. Turner
et al. [15,33] argue that the risk of compromised independence depends on three interre-
lated variables: Incentives, Opportunity and Integrity. These three factors are similar to
fraud triangle factors discussed earlier.
Another example of the general three-variable problem is assessing the risk of the inter-
nal audit function not being of high quality. Internal auditing is a key function within
most large organizations that is intended to monitor and improve the operating eﬀective-
ness and eﬃciencies of the organization it serves. Krishnamoorthy [10] has analyzed the
quality [‘strength’] of the internal audit function as a function of three interrelated vari-
ables: Competence, Work Performance, and Objectivity. Again, one can use the general
formulas developed in this article to assess the risk of the internal audit function not being
of high quality.
Usually, the degree to which factors aﬀecting a speciﬁc type of risk are present or absent
is not known with certainty. Thus, we use the Dempster–Shafer (D–S) theory of belief
functions to model the uncertainties associated with the items of evidence pertaining to
these variables [19,36]. Under the D–S theory of belief functions, risk is deﬁned by the
plausibility function [31]. In this article, we derive analytical formulas for propagating
beliefs in a network of four interacting binary variables; a risk variable and three other
interrelated variables that can aﬀect the risk variable. As part of our derivation, we use
the Shenoy and Shafer [23,24] approach for propagating beliefs through the network to
derive the general formulas.
To illustrate our solution for this class of risk assessment problems, we derive general
analytical formulas for propagating beliefs in a network where three binary variables, A,
B, and C, are related to a fourth binary variable Z through a logical ‘AND’ relationship.
In addition, we assume that variables A, B, and C may be interrelated in that a change in
one variable may aﬀect the value of each of the other two. The analytical formulas derived
determine the overall beliefs and plausibilities that Z is true or not true, given that we have
beliefs about variables A, B, and C. As noted above, such formulas provide analytical
models for assessing risks in several important real-world problems as discussed in Section
4.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. The next section introduces
belief functions while Section 3 develops the analytical formulas by combining seven sets
of belief functions using Shenoy and Shafer [24]. Section 4 discusses three real-world appli-
cations of the general formulas in assessing fraud risk in ﬁnancial reporting, assessing the
auditor’s independence risk in assurance services, and assessing the strength or quality of
the internal audit function by the external auditor. Section 5 provides the overall study
conclusions. Finally, Appendix A provides the proof of Theorem 1, and Appendix B pro-
vides the proof of Corollary 1 proposed in Section 3.
2. Introduction to the Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions
The D–S theory of belief functions is based on the work of Dempster [6] during the
1960s and the work of Shafer during the 1970s ([19], see also [20–23]). In fact, the D–S
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between the two frameworks, let us consider a variable X with q possible mutually exclu-
sive and exhaustive sets of values:2 x1,x2, . . . ,xq. This set of values deﬁnes the frame of X.
Let us denote this frame by the symbol HX = {x1,x2, . . . ,xq}. Suppose we do not know the
true state of variable X, i.e., we do not know what value X will take. In such a situation,
under probability framework we assign probability mass, P(xi), to each single element, xi,
of the frame HX in such a way that sum of these probability masses equals one, i.e.,Pq
i¼1P ðxiÞ ¼ 1, where 1P P(xi)P 0. Under the D–S theory, we assign belief mass to all
the possible subsets of the frame, HX, i.e., to all the singletons, all the subsets of two,
all the subsets of three, and so on to the entire frame HX. The belief mass assigned to a
subset, say Y, can be denoted by m(Y), and the sum of these belief masses equals one,
i.e.,
P
YHX mðY Þ ¼ 1, where 1P m(Y)P 0. By deﬁnition, the belief mass on the empty
set is zero. i.e., m(;) = 0. Shafer [19] calls this set of belief masses the basic probability
assignment function; we will call it the m-values or belief mass function or simply the mass
function. As one can see from the above deﬁnition of the mass function, the D–S theory
reduces to a probability framework if m-values for all the subsets except the singletons
are zero.
In more conceptual terms, the basic algebra of belief functions is relatively simple and
begins with developing beliefs about an assertion or issue based on items of evidence per-
taining to that assertion or issue. For example, when evaluating a general assertion, say
assertion A, evidence E1 may provide, in general, some support that assertion A is true,
i.e., ‘a’ is true, and some support that A is not true, i.e., ‘a’ is true. In terms of the mass
function we can write these assessments as mE1({a}) and mE1({a}), respectively. Lack of
knowledge about whether A is true or not true is represented by mE1({a,a}), such that
the sum of the three m-values is one. i.e., mE1({a}) + mE1({a}) + mE1({a, a}) = 1.
2.1. Belief functions
The belief in a subset, say Y, represents the total belief that Y is true and is the sum of
the m-values deﬁned at Y and the m-values deﬁned on any subsets contained in Y. Math-
ematically, it can be expressed as
BelðY Þ ¼
X
GY
mðGÞ:
For our example above, the belief that assertion A is true based on evidence E1 is given
by BelE1({a}) = mE1({a}), the belief that assertion A is not true is given by
BelE1({a}) = mE1({a}), and the belief that the assertion A is either true or not true is
given by BelE1({a, a}) = mE1({a}) + mE1({~a}) + mE1({a,~a}) = 1. A belief of one in a
statement represents certainty similar to a value of one for probability in a statement.
However, a belief of zero in a statement represents ignorance while a zero probability rep-
resents impossibility.2 We use the upper case letter for the name of the variable and lower case letter for its values. For example, if Z
is the name of a binary variable then ‘z’, and ‘z’, respectively, represent the two possible values of Z being true
or false. The frame of a variable is denoted by the symbol H with the variable as a subscript. For example, the
frame of variable Z is denoted by HZ = {z,z}.
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The plausibility in a subset, say Y, determines the maximum possible belief one could
assign to Y based on the current evidence and the assumption that all the future evidence
will be in favor of supporting the subset Y. In mathematical terms, this deﬁnition can be
written as
PlðY Þ ¼
X
G\Y 6¼;
mðGÞ:
For our example of assertion A described earlier, the plausibility that ‘a’ is true based
on the evidence E1 is given by PlE1({a}) = mE1({a}) + mE1({a,a}), and the plausibility
that ‘a’ is true is given by PlE1({a}) = mE1({a}) + mE1({a,a}).
2.3. Dempster’s rule of combination
Dempster’s rule [19] is used to combine independent items of evidence from multiple
sources. For combining two sets of mass functions deﬁned on the same frame, one can
write Dempster’s rule as
mðY Þ ¼
X
Y 1\Y 2¼Y
m1ðY 1Þm2ðY 2Þ=K; where K ¼ 1
X
Y 1\Y 2¼;
m1ðY 1Þm2ðY 2Þ:
K represents the renormalization constant deﬁned above as one minus the conﬂict.
To illustrate the concepts, let us consider our example of assertion A and the evidence
E1 that yield a set of m-values represented by mE1({a}), mE1({a}), and mE1({a,a}).
Consider a second source of evidence, E2, with the following mass function: mE2(a),
mE2(a), and mE2({a,a}). The combined mass function using Dempster’s rule is given as
mE12ðfagÞ ¼ ½mE1ðfagÞmE2ðfagÞ þ mE1ðfagÞmE2ðfa;agÞ
þ mE1ðfa;agÞmE2ðfagÞ=KE12;
mE12ðf agÞ ¼ ½mE1ðfagÞmE2ðfagÞ þ mE1ðfagÞmE2ðfa;agÞ
þ mE1ðfa;agÞmE2ðfagÞ=KE12;
mE12ðfa;agÞ ¼ ½mE1ðfa;agÞmE2ðfa;agÞ=KE12;
where KE12 is the renormalization constant deﬁned as
KE12 ¼ 1 ½mE1ðfagÞmE2ðfagÞ þ mE1ðfagÞmE2ðfagÞ:
The second term in KE12 represents conﬂict between the two sets of beliefs pertaining to
assertion A.
3. Analytical formulas
In this section, we develop the analytical formulas for propagating beliefs in the net-
work of binary variables shown in Fig. 1 from variables A, B, and C to the variable Z.
Variables A, B and C are related to Z through a logical ‘AND’ relationship. In addition,
in our derivation of the general formula we consider two-way relationships among the
variables A, B, and C. In other words, variable A is connected to B through a relationship
depicted by R1, B is connected to C through a relationship depicted by R2, and C is
Z{z, ~z}
AND
Evidence for B R1 R2
C{c, ~c}
B{b, ~b}
A{a, ~a}
Evidence for C Evidence for A 
R3
Fig. 1. Network of variables. (A rounded box represents a variable, a rectangle represents an item of evidence,
and a hexagonal box represents a relationship. These relationships are deﬁned in Table 1.)
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and are elaborated later in this section. We consider one item of evidence for each variable
A, B, and C as depicted in Fig. 1. However, one can extend the present approach to the
case where there is more than one item of evidence for each variable by using Dempster’s
rule to combine the multiple items of evidence for each variable as described in [28].
As mentioned earlier, we use the Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions to repre-
sent the uncertainties in the strength of evidence pertaining to individual variables A, B,
and C. Let us consider the following set of mass functions to represent the beliefs at these
variables:
The beliefs at variable A: mAðfagÞ ¼ mþA ; mAðfagÞ ¼ mA ;
mAðfa;agÞ ¼ mHA : ð1Þ
The beliefs at variable B: mBðfbgÞ ¼ mþB ; mBðfbgÞ ¼ mB ;
mBðfb;bgÞ ¼ mHB : ð2Þ
The beliefs at variable C: mCðfcgÞ ¼ mþC ; mCðfcgÞ ¼ mC ;
mCðfc;cgÞ ¼ mHC : ð3Þ
The interrelationships between A and B, between B and C, and between A and C, are
assumed to be of the following form:
Relationship between A and B: mABðfab;abgÞ ¼ r1;
mABðfab; ab;ab;abgÞ ¼ 1 r1: ð4Þ
Relationship between B and C: mBCðfbc;bcgÞ ¼ r2;
mBCðfbc; bc;bc;bcgÞ ¼ 1 r2: ð5Þ
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mACðfac; ac;ac;acgÞ ¼ 1 r3: ð6Þ
Various m-values and the interrelationships are deﬁned in Table 1.
These relationships imply that if one variable, say A, is true then variable B also is true
with a belief given by the corresponding strength of the relationship represented by r1 and
variable C is true with a belief given by the corresponding strength of the relationship rep-
resented by r3, assuming there is no other belief deﬁned for variables B and C. In addition,
if one variable is false then the other variables also are false, again with a belief given by
the corresponding strength of the relationships. The values of the strength of each of the
relationships, ri’s, lie between zero and 1 where a zero value means there is no relationship
between the two variables. A value of one for a relationship implies that if one variable is
true with a given degree of belief then the related variable also is true with the same degree
of belief assuming that there is no other belief deﬁned for the related variable. For exam-
ple, if A is true with a belief of, say 0.9 (i.e., Bel({a}) = 0.9) and we assume that there is no
relationship between B and C (i.e., r2 = 0) and there are no beliefs from any other source at
B and C, then B will be true with a belief of 0.9 and C will be true with a belief of 0.9 if
r1 = 1 and r3 = 1. Also, under the above condition (i.e., r1 = 1 and r3 = 1), if A is not true
with a belief of, say 0.9 (i.e., Bel(a) = 0.9) then B will also be not true with a belief of 0.9,
and C will not be true with a belief of 0.9.
Such relationships are quite common in real-world situations as discussed in Section 4
in detail. For example, even though management of a company may appear to have high
integrity, if incentives exist for management to beneﬁt from misrepresenting ﬁnancial
information, their ethics may be compromised to the point of committing ﬁnancial state-
ment fraud to achieve those incentives. Similarly, if management’s integrity is compro-
mised, then incentives and/or opportunities may be created to beneﬁt from committing
fraud. On the other hand, if there are no incentives to beneﬁt from committing fraud or
no opportunities available, then management will behave appropriately and not commit
fraud. These interrelationships can be modeled using the above relationships.
The logical relationship ‘AND’ between Z and the variables A, B, and C is expressed in
terms of the following mass function (see [29] for details):
mZABCðHZABCÞ ¼ 1:0: ð7Þ
where HZABC = {zabc,zabc,zabc,zabc,zabc,zabc,zabc,za
bc}.
In the present problem, we have seven mass functions, three corresponding to the vari-
ables A, B, and C, (i.e., mA, mB, and mC) and four representing the interrelationships, mAB,
mBC, mAC, and mZABC, as given in (4)–(7). To derive the analytical formulas for the mass
function at variable Z, we need to combine all seven mass functions and marginalize3 the
result to variable Z:3 The marginalization process in D–S theory is similar to the marginalization process in probability theory. For
example, suppose we have a probability distribution over two variables A and B and we want the distribution
over just one variable, say A. The second variable B can be eliminated by summing the probabilities over variable
B to obtain the probability distribution over A. Similarly, under D–S theory, if we have a mass function deﬁned
over the joint space of variables A and B, then we can obtain the mass function deﬁned just over variable A by
summing the mass function over the variable B.
Table 1
List of symbols and their descriptions
Symbol Description
General analytical formula
Z{z,z} Binary variable Z that is related to three binary variables, A, B, and C, through the
logical relationship ‘AND’ where z and z represent that Z is true and not true,
respectively
A{a,a} Binary variable A where a and a represent that A is true and not true, respectively
B{b,b} Binary variable B where b and b represent that B is true and not true, respectively
C{c,c} Binary variable C where c and c represent that C is true and not true, respectively
R1, r1 R1 denotes the relational node between A and B and r1 represents its strength
R2, r2 R2 denotes the relational node between B and C and r2 represents its strength
R3, r3 R3 denotes the relational node between A and C and r3 represents its strength
m..(..) The basic belief mass (m-value) for the value of the variable in the parenthesis from
the evidence represented by the subscript
H.. This symbol represents the frame of a variable denoted by the subscript.
For example, the frame of variable ‘A’ is represented as HA = {a,a}
mþA ;m
þ
B and m
þ
C m-values supporting the presence of the factors A, B, and C, respectively
mA ;m

B and m

C m-values negating the presence of the factors A, B, and C, respectively
mHA ;m
H
B and m
H
C m-values representing the basic beliefs on the entire frame of the variables
represented by the subscript
Bel..(..) The belief that the argument in the parenthesis is true
Pl..(..) The plausibility that the argument in the parenthesis is true
K A normalization constant
BelZ ABC({z}) The belief that Z is true after all beliefs from variables A, B, and C have been
propagated to Z and combined
BelZ ABC({z}) The belief that Z is not true after all beliefs from variables A, B, and C have been
propagated to Z and combined
PlZ ABC({z}) The plausibility that Z is true after all beliefs from variables A, B, and C have
been propagated to Z and combined
PlZ ABC({z}) The plausibility that Z is not true after all beliefs from variables A, B, and C have
been propagated to Z and combined
Application to assessing belief and plausibility in fraud
F{f,f} F represents the variable ‘Fraud’. Values f and f represent that F is true, and not
true, respectively. In other words, ‘f’ represents that fraud is present and ‘f’that
fraud is not present
I{i,i} I represents the variable ‘Incentive’. Values i and i represent that I is true and
not true, respectively. In other words, i represents that there is an incentive and
i represents that there is no incentive
D{d,d} D represents the variable ‘Attitude’. Values d and d represent that D is true and
not true, respectively. In other words, d represents that management’s attitude
rationalizes the commitment of fraud, and d the opposite of d
O{o,o} O represents the variable ‘Opportunity’. Values o and o represent that O is true
and not true, respectively. In other words, o represents that there is an opportunity
and o represents that there is no opportunity
mþI ;m
þ
D ;m
þ
O m-values supporting the presence of the factors I, D, and O, respectively
mI ;m

D ;m

O m-values negating the presence of the factors I, D, and O, respectively
mHI ;m
H
D , and m
H
O m-values representing the basic beliefs on the entire frame of the variables
represented by the subscript
ETI, ETD, ETO Evidence about threat factors pertaining to Incentive (I), Attitude (D), and
Opportunity (O)
ESI, ESD, ESO Evidence about safeguard factors pertaining to Incentive (I), Attitude (D), and
Opportunity (O)
EPI Evidence related to whether fraud (F) is present or not based on prior
information (PI),
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Table 1 (continued)
Symbol Description
EFP Evidence related to whether fraud (F) is present or not obtained from forensic
procedures
EOP Evidence related to whether fraud (F) is present or not from procedures other than
forensic procedures
PlPI(f), PlFP(f), PlOP(f) Plausibility of fraud based on prior information (PI), evidence from forensic
procedures (FP), and evidence from other procedures (OP), respectively
PlTI(i), PlTD(d), PlTO(o) The plausibility that an incentive exists (i), management may have an attitude
(d) rationalizing fraud, and opportunities exist (o) because of the corresponding
threat factors
PlSI(i), PlSD(d), PlSO(o) The plausibility that an incentive exists (i), management may have an attitude
(d) rationalizing fraud, and opportunities exist (o) because of ineﬀective safeguards
KT, KF, KI, KD, KO, Normalization constants
Application to auditor independence impairment
N{n,n} N represents the variable ‘Independence Risk’. Values n and n represent that
N is true, and not true, respectively. In other words, n represents that
independence has been impaired and ‘n’ that independence has not been
impaired
I{i,i} I represents the variable ‘Incentive’. Values i and i represent that I is true and
not true, respectively. In other words, i represents that a threat to independence
exists in the form of an incentive and i represents that there is no threat
D{d,d} D represents the variable ‘Attitude’. Values d and d represent that D is true and
not true, respectively. In other words, d represents that the auditor’s attitude
rationalizes the impairment of independence, and d the opposite of d
O{o,o} O represents the variable ‘Opportunity’. Values o and o represent that O is true
and not true, respectively. In other words, o represents that a threat to
independence exists in the form of an opportunity and o represents that there is
no opportunity
Application to internal audit function quality
H{h,h} H represents the quality of the internal audit function. Values h and h represent
that H is true, and not true, respectively. In other words, h represents that the
quality of the internal audit function is high and h that quality is low
P{p,p} P represents the variable ‘Competence’. Values p and p represent that P is true
and not true, respectively. In other words, p represents that the internal auditor is
competent and p represents that the auditor is not competent
W{w,w} W represents the variable ‘Work Performance’. Values w and w represent that
W is true and not true, respectively. In other words, w represents that the work
performance of the auditor is high and w represents that the work performance
is low
J{j,j} J represents the variable ‘Internal Auditor Objectivity’. Values j and j represent
that J is true and not true, respectively. In other words, j represents that the
internal auditor is objective and j represents that the auditor is not objective
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where mZ ABC represents the mass function at Z propagated from variables A, B, and C,
the symbol  denotes the combination of beliefs, i.e., mass functions, using Dempster’s
rule, and the symbol #Z represents the process of marginalization of the combined mass
function within the parenthesis to the frame of variable Z. We express these results
through the following theorem.
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C, through the logical relationship ‘AND’, and where the variables A, B, and C are
interrelated, the mass function propagated to Z from variables A, B, and C is given by the
following expressions:
mZ ABCðf;gÞ
¼ ½r2 þ r1r3ð1 r2ÞmHA ðmþBmC þ mBmþC Þ þ ½r3 þ r1r2ð1 r3ÞmHB ðmþAmC þ mAmþC Þ
þ ½r1 þ r2r3ð1 r1ÞmHC ðmþAmB þ mAmþB Þ þ ðr1 þ r2  r1r2Þ
 ðmþAmBmþC þ mAmþBmC Þ þ ðr2 þ r3  r2r3ÞðmþAmþBmC þ mAmBmþC Þ
þ ðr1 þ r3  r1r3ÞðmAmþBmþC þ mþAmBmC Þ; ð9Þ
mZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ mþAmþBmþC þ ðr1 þ r2  r1r2ÞmþAmHB mþC þ ðr1 þ r3  r1r3ÞmHA mþBmþC
þ ðr2 þ r3  r2r3ÞmþAmþBmHC þ ðr1r2 þ r2r3 þ r1r3  2r1r2r3Þ
 ðmþAmHB mHC þ mHA mþBmHC þ mHA mHB mþC Þ; ð10Þ
mZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 1 mZ ABCðf;gÞ  ðmþA þ mHA ÞðmþB þ mHB ÞðmþC þ mHC Þ; ð11Þ
mZ ABCðfz;zgÞ
¼ mHA mHB mHC þ ð1 r1Þð1 r2ÞmþAmHB mþC þ ð1 r1Þð1 r3ÞmHA mþBmþC
þ ð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞmþAmþBmHC þ ð1 r1r2  r2r3  r1r3 þ 2r1r2r3Þ
 ðmþAmHB mHC þ mHA mþBmHC þ mHA mHB mþC Þ: ð12ÞProof of Theorem 1. See Appendix A for the proof.
By deﬁnition, the beliefs in ‘z’ and ‘z’, i.e., Bel({z}) and Bel({z}), are respectively
equal to the normalized m-values, m({z}) and m({z}). The normalization constant K is
deﬁned as
K ¼ 1 mZ ABCð;Þ; ð13Þ
Using (9) and (13), one can obtain the following expression for K:
K ¼ 1 ½r2 þ r1r3ð1 r2ÞmHA ðmþBmC þ mBmþC Þ  ½r3 þ r1r2ð1 r3Þ
 mHB ðmþAmC þ mAmþC Þ  ½r1 þ r2r3ð1 r1ÞmHC ðmþAmB þ mAmþB Þ
 ðr1 þ r2  r1r2ÞðmþAmBmþC þ mAmþBmC Þ  ðr2 þ r3  r2r3Þ
 ðmþAmþBmC þ mAmBmþC Þ  ðr1 þ r3  r1r3ÞðmAmþBmþC þ mþAmBmC Þ: ð14Þ
Using the deﬁnitions of BelZ ABC({z}) and BelZ ABC({z}) and (10)–(12) and (14), we
obtain the following expressions for the beliefs:
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ¼mZ ABCðfzgÞ=K¼½mþAmþBmþCþðr1þr2r1r2ÞmþAmHB mþC
þðr1þr3r1r3ÞmHA mþBmþCþðr2þr3r2r3ÞmþAmþBmHC
þðr1r2þr2r3þr1r32r1r2r3ÞðmþAmHB mHC þmHA mþBmHC þmHA mHB mþC Þ=K:
ð15Þ
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ¼mZ ABCðfzgÞ=K¼1ðmþA þmHA ÞðmþB þmHB ÞðmþCþmHC Þ=K;
ð16Þ
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yields the following expression:
PlZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 1 BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ ðmþA þ mHA ÞðmþB þ mHB ÞðmþC þ mHC Þ=K: ð17Þ
The plausibility in ‘z’ is expressed as
PlZ ABCðfzgÞ
¼ 1 ½mþAmþBmþC þ ðr1 þ r2  r1r2ÞmþAmHB mþC þ ðr1 þ r3  r1r3ÞmHA mþBmþC
þ ðr2 þ r3  r2r3ÞmþAmþBmHC þ ðr1r2 þ r2r3 þ r1r3  2r1r2r3Þ
 ðmþAmHB mHC þ mHA mþBmHC þ mHA mHB mþC Þ=K: ð18Þ
Since the plausibilities in ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ are deﬁned as: PlAðaÞ ¼ ðmþA þ mHA Þ,
PlBðbÞ ¼ ðmþB þ mHB Þ, and PlCðcÞ ¼ ðmþC þ mHC Þ, we obtain from (7):
PlZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ PlAðaÞPlBðbÞPlCðcÞ=K: ð19Þ3.1. Discussion of Theorem 1 results
The results of Theorem 1 are comprehensible. For example, the conﬂict term,
mZ ABC(;) in (9) consists of 12 components. The ﬁrst six components arise from situations
where one variable has non-zero m-values on its frame; the second variable has non-zero
m-values in its support; and the third variable has a non-zero m-value for its negation,
hence the conﬂict. The conﬂict is clear in the other six components also. Three components
are such that two variables have non-zero m-values in their support and the third has an
m-value for its negation, while in the case of other three components, one variable has a
non-zero m-value in its support and the other two have non-zero m-values against them
being true.
The belief in ‘z’, i.e., BelZ ABC(z), also is comprehensible. Since the three variables,
A, B, and C, are related to variable Z through a logical ‘AND’, one expects ‘z’ to be true
when ‘a’ is true, or ‘b’ is true, or ‘c’ is true. In probability framework, one can write
this as:
P ðzÞ ¼ P ða or b or cÞ ¼ 1 P ðaÞP ðbÞP ðcÞ
¼ 1 ð1 P ðaÞÞð1 P ðbÞÞð1 P ðcÞÞ;
which is equivalent to Bel({z}) = 1  (1  m({a}))(1  m({b}))(1  m({c}))/K in
(16). This reasoning also supports the formula for plausibility in ‘z’ as the product of three
plausibilities, PlA(a), PlB(b), and PlC(c) in (19). As discussed later, plausibility Pl(z) deter-
mines the risk associated with Z that it is true, even though there may not be any belief
that Z is true [31].
The expressions in Eqs. (15), (16), and (19) are important results. As shown in the appli-
cation section, these expressions can be used to model risks and beliefs in the following
situations. (1) The belief and plausibility that fraud exists in a ﬁnancial audit, (2) the belief
and plausibility that the auditor is not independent from an audit client, and (3) the belief
and plausibility that the internal audit function does not produce high quality work. In the
rest of this section, we discuss special cases of Theorem 1.
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3.2.1. Case 1. No interrelationships, i.e., r1 = r2 = r3 = 0
Here we discuss a case where all the interrelationships among the three variables, A, B,
and C are assumed not to exist, i.e., r1 = r2 = r3 = 0. First, we express the beliefs in ‘z’ and
‘z’ in terms of Corollary 1 given below and then discuss the results.
Corollary 1. For r1 = r2 = r3 = 0, the beliefs propagated to Z from variables A, B, and C are
given by the following formulas given that variable Z is related to variables, A, B, and C,
through the logical relationship ‘AND’:
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ mþAmþBmþC ; ð20Þ
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 1 ðmþA þ mHA ÞðmþB þ mHB ÞðmþC þ mHC Þ; ð21ÞProof of Corollary 1. See Appendix B.
Eqs. (20) and 21 are a special case of Eqs. (15) and (16), where there are no
interrelationships among the variables A, B, and C, (i.e., r1 = r2 = r3 = 0). It can be seen
from (14) that the normalization constant K, reduces to 1 under this condition and the
expressions for beliefs in (15) and (16) reduce to (20) and (21), respectively. From (20), one
can write the belief in ‘z’ that it is true in the following form:4
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 1 ð1 BelAðfagÞÞð1 BelBðfbgÞÞð1 BelCðfcgÞÞ:
The above relationship is intuitive and as discussed earlier, is equivalent to the follow-
ing relationship among the variables under the probability framework:
P ðzÞ ¼ P ða or b or cÞ ¼ 1 P ðaÞP ðbÞP ðcÞ
¼ 1 ð1 PðaÞÞð1 PðbÞÞð1 PðcÞÞ:
The belief that ‘z’ is true, i.e., BelZ ABC({z}) is non-zero, results only under the condi-
tion that mþA , m
þ
B , and m
þ
C are non-zero simultaneously. This is an intuitive result. Since A,
B, and C are related to Z through the logical ‘AND’, ‘z’ is true under only one condition
that ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ are true at the same time. This means that the belief that ‘z’ is true is
equal to the product of the three beliefs, BelA({a}), BelB({b}), and BelC({c}). However, as
one can see from (15), if the interrelationships are non-zero, then BelZ ABC({z}) is non-
zero even if only one variable has a non-zero mþ:: . This result has practical implications,
as we will show in the next section. For example, it is argued and supported empirically
[3,11] that the presence of the following three factors: Incentive, Attitude, and Opportu-
nity, must exist for management to commit fraud. However, under strong interrelation-
ships among the three factors, even if only one factor is present, the belief that fraud
may exist can be high.4 Since ðmþA þmHA Þ ¼ 1mA ¼ 1BelAðfagÞ, ðmþB þmHB Þ ¼ 1mB ¼ 1BelBðfbgÞ, ðmþC þmHC Þ ¼ 1mC ¼
1BelCðfcgÞ, we obtain BelZ ABC({z}) = 1  (1  BelA({a}))(1  BelB({b}))(1  BelC({c})).
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Here we assume that r1 = r2 = r3 = r. For this case the normalization constant K, and
the beliefs propagated to Z from variables A, B and C are given by the following expres-
sions using (14)–(16):
K ¼ 1 ½r þ r2  r3½mHA ðmþBmC þ mBmþC Þ þ mHB ðmþAmC þ mAmþC Þ
þ mHC ðmþAmB þ mAmþB Þ  ð2r  r2Þ½mþAmBmþC þ mAmþBmC
þ mþAmþBmC þ mAmBmþC þ mAmþBmþC þ mþAmBmC ; ð22Þ
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ ½mþAmþBmþC þ ð2r  r2Þ½mþAmHB mþC þ mHA mþBmþC þ mþAmþBmHC 
þ r2ð3 2rÞðmþAmHB mHC þ mHA mþBmHC þ mHA mHB mþC Þ=K; ð23Þ
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 1 ðmþA þ mHA ÞðmþB þ mHB ÞðmþC þ mHC Þ=K: ð24Þ
From (22) we can see that the normalization constant K starts with a value of 1 at r = 0,
decreases as r increases, and is smallest at r = 1. However, if we choose any two variables,
say B and C, to have no knowledge about their presence or absence, i.e., mHB ¼ 1 and
mHC ¼ 1, then the normalization constant K equals 1 for all values of r, and the beliefs
reduce to
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ r2ð3 2rÞmþA ; and BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ mA :
This is an interesting result. Usually, under an ‘AND’ relationship and in the absence of any
interrelationships (i.e., r = 0), when mþB ¼ 0, and mþC ¼ 0, one expects BelZ ABC ({z}) = 0,
which is what we get from the above result. However, if we assume strong interrelationships
(say, r = 1) among the variables A, B, and C, BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ mþA , which makes logical
sense. Because of the strong interrelationship, even though two of the three factors, say
B and C, have zero belief masses in support of the corresponding variables, the belief in
‘z’ is simply equal to the m-value for ‘a’. This result has important practical implications
in assessing fraud risk as we show in the next section.
Let us consider another situation where we have no knowledge about the presence or
absence of just one variable, say C, i.e., mHC ¼ 1. The normalization constant K, and the
beliefs are given by the following expressions (see (22)–(24)):
K ¼ 1 ðr þ r2  r3ÞðmþAmB þ mAmþB Þ; ð25Þ
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ ½ð2r  r2ÞmþAmþB þ r2ð3 2rÞðmþAmHB þ mHA mþB Þ=K; ð26Þ
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 1 ðmþA þ mHA ÞðmþB þ mHB Þ=K: ð27Þ
Eqs. (26) and (27) again show that if the interrelationships are non-zero, even if we have no
information about the presence or absence of one of the variables, but do have beliefs
about the presence or absence of the other two variables, a non-zero belief for ‘z’ is pro-
vided because of the interrelationships.
3.2.3. Case 3. No knowledge about the presence of all the three factors but partial
knowledge about their absence
In this case, we assume that we have no belief that the three factors A, B, and C are
present, i.e., mþA ¼ mþB ¼ mþC ¼ 0, and mA , mB and mC are greater than zero. For these val-
ues, there is no conﬂict and thus, the renormalization constant K in (14) becomes 1 for any
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reduce to
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 0; BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 1 ð1 mA Þð1 mB Þð1 mC Þ;
PlZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ ð1 mA Þð1 mB Þð1 mC Þ ¼ PlðfagÞPlðfbgÞPlðfcgÞ; and
PlZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 1:
Again, the above results make intuitive sense. Since the mass values in support of all the
three factors are zero, the m-value for ‘z’ is zero also even if the interrelationships are
strongest, i.e., all r’s = 1. The plausibility that Z is true is simply a product of three plau-
sibilities for ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’. Such a result is of a great value to the auditor because of its
simplicity, especially when the auditor is planning an audit where fraud is suspected as
brieﬂy discussed in the next section.
3.2.4. Case 4. No information on one variable and no relationship with the other
two variables
For this case, let us assume that we do not have any information on variable B, i.e.,
mHB ¼ 1, and also assume that there is no relationship between variables A and B, or
between B and C, i.e., r1 = r2 = 0. Substituting the above values in (14)–(18), we obtain
the following expressions for belief and plausibility in z and z:
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 0;
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 1 ð1 mA Þð1 mC Þ=K;
PlZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ ð1 mA Þð1 mC Þ=K ¼ PlðfagÞPlðfcgÞ=K;
PlZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 1;
where K ¼ 1 r3ðmþAmC þ mAmþC Þ.
The above results are logical. Since we do not have any knowledge about the presence
or absence of variable B and since there is no relationship between A and B or B and C,
knowing about the presence or absence of either A or C or both, does not aﬀect B. Thus,
the belief in z, i.e., BelZ ABC({z}), should be zero because of the logical ‘AND’ relation-
ship: z = a ^ b ^ c. This is what we get for this case for BelZ ABC({z}) as shown above.
3.2.5. Case 5. No information on one variable and no relationship between the other
two variables
For this case, let us assume we have no information on variable B, i.e., mHB ¼ 1, and also
assume there is no relationship between variables A and C, i.e., r3 = 0. Substituting the
above values in (14)–(18), we obtain the following expressions for belief and plausibility
in z and z:
BelZ A;B;CðfzgÞ ¼ ½ðr1 þ r2  r1r2ÞmþAmþC þ r1r2ðmþAmHC þ mHA mþC Þ=K;
BelZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 1 ð1 mA Þð1 mC Þ=K;
PlZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ ð1 mA Þð1 mC Þ=K ¼ PlðfagÞPlðfcgÞ=K;
PlZ ABCðfzgÞ ¼ 1 ½ðr1 þ r2  r1r2ÞmþAmþC þ r1r2ðmþAmHC þ mHA mþC Þ=K;
where K ¼ 1 r1r2ðmþAmC þ mAmþC Þ.
This case is more interesting than the previous case. Since variable B is related to both A
and C (r1 > 0 and r2 > 0), knowing about the presence or absence of A and C tells us about
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ence or absence of B, the knowledge of the presence or absence of A and C results in a non-
zero belief in z and/or z. In fact, this belief is higher if both r1 and r2 are greater than zero
and increases with the increase in their strengths.
Another interesting result is that the conﬂict term in K arises because of the two-way
interaction; knowledge about A gives us the knowledge about B through r1 and then tells
us about C through r2. Similarly, knowledge about C tells us about B through r2 and tells
us about A thought r1. Thus, even though there is no direct link between A and C(r3 = 0)
in the present case, because of the interrelationships between A and B and between B and
C, we have non-zero conﬂict.
The above result is of a great signiﬁcance in assessing fraud risk since all three fraud
factors, an Incentive to commit fraud (I), an Attitude to commit fraud (D), and the
Opportunity to commit fraud (O) must be present for management to commit fraud.
If one assumes no relationship between the two factors (variables) I and O, and there
is no knowledge about D (management attitude to commit fraud) because of the diﬃcul-
ties in measuring attitude, fraud still may be believed to be possible. That is, the belief
about the risk of fraud can be greater than zero because knowledge that both an incen-
tive and opportunity exist creates a belief that management may have an attitude to com-
mit fraud, even through there is no direct knowledge about management’s attitude
toward fraud.
4. Applications
Here we illustrate three important applications of the general results presented in
Theorem 1. The main purpose of presenting these applications is to show the importance
of the general results derived in the present paper. The ﬁrst application deals with an
assessment by the external auditor of belief and plausibility that an audit client’s internal
audit function is not of high enough quality to allow the external auditor to rely on the
work of that internal auditor. The second application deals with assessing the belief and
plausibility that in an audit engagement the auditor is not independent of the client.
The third application deals with the assessment of belief and plausibility that a company’s
management may have committed fraud in reporting ﬁnancial results. In addition to using
the general results for assessing the above beliefs and plausibilities by the auditing profes-
sion, regulators such as the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) can assess from a
regulator’s perspective the beliefs and plausibilities that fraud may exist or that an auditor
is not independent in an engagement.
4.1. Application to internal audit function quality
The ﬁrst application of the general results of Theorem 1 deals with the assessment of the
quality of the internal audit function. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter SOX),
requires management of publicly-traded companies to document, evaluate, and report
on the eﬀectiveness of internal controls over ﬁnancial reporting and that the independent
auditor evaluate and opine on management’s assessment of such controls. SOX also
requires companies covered by the Act to maintain an internal audit function. That is,
each company must employ non-independent internal auditors whose function is the
examination and appraisal of both controls and performance. This requirement also
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forming an integrated audit now required under Audit Standard No. 2 [16].
For independent auditors to rely on work performed by an internal auditor, the inde-
pendent auditor must assess the quality of the internal audit function [16] as to whether it
is of high quality or not.5 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [16] contends
that the considerable ﬂexibility that external auditors have in using the work of the inter-
nal auditor should encourage companies to develop high-quality internal audit functions,
especially to reduce the cost of documentation and evaluation of internal controls. The
external auditor will be able to rely more extensively on the internal audit function if they
perceive the quality of the internal audit function to be high [16]. Even prior to SOX,
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 65 [2] outlined various ways independent auditors
could enhance the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of an independent audit by relying on the
work of internal auditors.
There is a substantial body of accounting literature that focuses on the external audi-
tor’s assessment of the quality of internal audit function [1,4,8,10,12–14,25–27]. The main
ﬁnding of these studies is that the quality of an internal audit function depends on three
quality factors—Competence (P), Work performance (W), and Internal Auditor Objectiv-
ity (J). Competence deals with academic and professional qualiﬁcations. Work Perfor-
mance deals with the quality of work, such as assessment of internal controls, risk
assessment, and substantive procedures performed by the internal auditor. The Internal
Auditor Objectivity deals with how independent internal auditors are in terms of evaluat-
ing and reporting weaknesses in the internal control systems. The presence of these three
factors is found to be essential for the internal audit function to be of high quality. The
literature also has identiﬁed interrelationships among these factors6 [7,10]. Thus, the prob-
lem of assessing the quality of internal audit function is similar to that of assessing whether
fraud is present or that an auditor is not independent.
The three factors P, W, and J, are related to the internal audit function through the
logical ‘‘AND’’ relationship. The ‘‘AND’’ relationship between the quality of internal
audit function and the three factors P, W, and J implies that h = p ^ w ^ j, which implies
that the quality of the internal audit function is high if and only if the internal auditor is
competent (p), the internal auditor’s work performance is of high quality (w), and the
internal auditor is objective (j). Thus, the problem of assessing the quality of audit func-
tion is equivalent to assessing whether variable Z is present in Fig. 1, i.e., h = p ^ w ^ j is
equivalent to the relationship z = a ^ b ^ c (compare Fig. 2 with Fig. 1).
Thus, we can write the belief that the internal audit function is of high quality (h) given
that we have knowledge about the presence or absence of the factors, Competence (P),
Work performance (W), and Objectivity (J), in terms mass functions by using (14) and
(15) and replacing ‘a’ by ‘p’, ‘b’ by ‘w’, and ‘c’ by ‘j’
BelðfhgÞ ¼ ½mþP mþW mþJ þ ðr1 þ r2  r1r2ÞmþP mHW mþJ þ ðr1 þ r3  r1r3ÞmHP mþW mþJ
þ ðr2 þ r3  r2r3ÞmþP mþW mHJ þ ðr1r2 þ r2r3 þ r1r3  2r1r2r3Þ
 ðmþP mHW mHJ þ mHP mþW mHJ þ mHP mHW mþJ Þ=K: ð28Þ5 We denote the variable that the internal audit function is of high quality by the symbol H and the two values
by ‘h’ and ‘h’, respectively, representing that H is true and not true.
6 In prior research, these factors have been assumed to be binary in nature, i.e., whether the factor is present or
absent, or whether the internal audit function is of high quality (h) or is not of high quality (h).
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Fig. 2. Diagram representing network of variables for internal audit function evaluation with associated items of
evidence. (Similar to Figs. 2 and 3, a rounded box here represents a variable, a rectangle represents an item of
evidence, and a hexagonal box represents a relationship. These relationships are deﬁned in Table 1 similar to the
relationships in Fig. 1.)
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K ¼ 1 ½r2 þ r1r3ð1 r2ÞmHP ðmþW mJ þ mW mþJ Þ  ½r3 þ r1r2ð1 r3Þ
 mHW ðmþP mJ þ mP mþJ Þ  ½r1 þ r2r3ð1 r1ÞmHJ ðmþP mW þ mP mþW Þ
 ðr1 þ r2  r1r2ÞðmþP mW mþJ þ mP mþW mJ Þ  ðr2 þ r3  r2r3Þ
 ðmþP mþW mJ þ mP mW mþJ Þ  ðr1 þ r3  r1r3ÞðmP mþW mþJ þ mþP mW mJ Þ: ð29Þ
Various m-values and the interrelationships are deﬁned in Table 1.
Eq. (28) is the general expression for the belief that the internal audit function is of high
quality. If we assume that there is no relationships among the quality factors, i.e., all r’s
are zero, then the belief that the internal audit function is of high quality, Bel({h}), is sim-
ply equal to mþP m
þ
W m
þ
J . This implies that the internal audit function will be of high quality
under only one condition—the internal auditor is competent (i.e., mP ðpÞ  mþP > 0Þ, the
work performance is of high quality (i.e., mW ðwÞ  mþW > 0Þ, and the internal auditor is
objective (i.e., mJðjÞ  mþJ > 0Þ. Because of the limited space in the current article, we
do not discuss various scenarios of (28). Interested readers should see Desai et al. [7]
who provide a detailed discuss of the assessment of the internal audit function under belief
function for various scenarios.
4.2. Application to auditor independence impairment
In this section, we demonstrate the use of the general results of Theorem 1 to assess the
belief and plausibility that an auditor is not independent from an audit client. For an audi-
tor to be independent, he/she must not exhibit bias favoring the clients representations
included in ﬁnancial statements when such representations may not be appropriate under
accepted accounting rules or governmental regulations. Fig. 3 represents a diagram of the
variables that determine whether auditor is independent (N). This diagram is based on the
Incentive (I) 
Attitude (D) 
Opportunity (O) 
Auditor is not 
Independent
(N)
Evidence of Safeguards 
That Impact Incentives (ESI)
Evidence of Threats that Impact
 Incentives (ETI)
Evidence of Safeguards 
That Impact Attitude (ESD)
Evidence of Threats that Impact
Attitude (ETD)
Evidence of Safeguards 
that Impact Opportunity (ESO)
Evidence of Threats that Impact 
Opportunity (ETO)
AND
R1
R2
R3
Fig. 3. Diagram representing network of variables for auditor independence risk with associated items of
evidence. (A rounded box represents a variable, a rectangle represents an item of evidence, and a hexagonal box
represents a relationship. These relationships are deﬁned in Table 1 similar to the relationships in Fig. 1.)
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if and only if all three factors, Incentive (I), Attitude (D), and Opportunity (O) are present.
In other words, the auditor will not maintain independence if and only if the auditor has
an incentive to gain from being not independent, has an attitude to be not independent,
and has an opportunity to be not independent. This relationship can be written as
n = i ^ d ^ o which is equivalent to the relationship z = a ^ b ^ c (Compare Fig. 2 with
Fig. 1).
As we see, Fig. 3 is very similar to Fig. 2 except that we have two items of evidence for
each variable I, D, and O, whereas we have only one item of evidence for each variable, P,
W, and J, in Fig. 2. Of the two items of evidence pertaining to each variable in Fig. 3, one
determines the impact of threats that increase the presence of the corresponding variable
and the other supports the negation of the related variable. The formulas for beliefs and
plausibilities that the auditor is independent or not independent can be derived directly
from (15)–(18) by substituting ‘N’ for ‘Z’, ‘I’ for ‘A’, ‘D’ for ‘B’, and ‘O’ for ‘C’. However,
since we have two items of evidence for each of the three variables, I, D, and O, we ﬁrst
need to determine the total belief mass function at each of the variables by combining
them using Dempster’s rule. We then use (15)–(18) to determine the beliefs and plausibil-
ities as to whether the auditor is independent or not. For a detailed discussion, we refer
readers to [15].
4.3. Application to assessing belief and plausibility in fraud
As discussed earlier, the American Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants (AICPA)
published Statement of Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit (SAS No. 99) [3] requiring auditors during an audit to assess the risk of
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discussion on factors that if present may be indicators that fraud is present. These fraud
risk factors generally are classiﬁed into three categories known as fraud triangle factors:
Incentive (I), Attitude (D), and Opportunity (O). In other words, management may com-
mit fraud in ﬁnancial statements if all of the following three conditions exist: there is an
incentive for management to commit fraud, management lacks integrity or has an attitude
conducive to committing fraud, and there is an opportunity to commit fraud. SAS No. 99
also indicates that safeguards may exist that reduce the possibility of the presence of the
above fraud risk factors and that such safeguards should be evaluated as to eﬀectiveness.
Fig. 4 represents a diagram of the interrelationship of the three conditions I, D, and O with
a fourth variable F, representing the assertion that management fraud is present, along
with the interrelationships among themselves.
Although SAS No. 99 provides a detailed description of fraud risk factors associated
with various fraud triangle factors, it does not provide any guidance on how to assess
and aggregate the impacts of these factors on the presence or absence of fraud. To develop
a complete fraud risk assessment model as shown in Fig. 4, we consider two items of evi-
dence for each fraud triangle variable similar to Fig. 3 considered for the auditor indepen-
dence impairment case. One item of evidence pertains to fraud risk factors related to the
corresponding fraud triangle variable. For example, management may have bonus plans
and other perquisites tied to ﬁnancial performance. This factor may create an incentive
for management to commit fraud. Such pieces of information are treated in our model
as one item of evidence as fraud risks pertaining to the corresponding variable. In
Fig. 4, ETI, ETD, and ETO represent evidence about threat factors pertaining to incentive
(I), attitude (D), and opportunity (O), respectively. The other item of evidence depicts pre-
ventative controls or safeguards related to the fraud triangle variable. For example, theIncentive (I) 
Attitude (D) 
Opportunity (O) 
Fraud in 
Assertion (F) 
Evidence from Forensic 
Procedures (EFP)
Evidence from Other 
Procedures (EOP)
Evidence from Prior 
Information (EPI)
Evidence of Safeguards 
that Impact Incentives (ESI)
Evidence of Threat Factors that 
Impact Incentives (ETI)
Evidence of Safeguards 
that Impact Attitude (ESD)
Evidence of Threat Factors that 
Impact Attitude (ETD)
Evidence of Safeguards 
that Impact Opportunity (ESO)
Evidence of Threat Factors that 
Impact Opportunity (ETO)
AND
R1
R2
R3
Fig. 4. Diagram representing network of variables with associated items of evidence. (A rounded box represents a
variable, a rectangle represents an item of evidence, and a hexagonal box represents a relationship. These
relationships are deﬁned in Table 1 similar to the relationships in Fig. 1.)
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control management behavior related to incentives to commit fraud or there may be
strong internal accounting controls in place to reduce opportunities for management to
commit fraud. Such factors can reduce the likelihood of the presence of the corresponding
fraud triangle variable. In Fig. 4, ESI, ESD, and ESO, respectively, represent evidence about
safeguard factors pertaining to incentive (I), attitude (D), and opportunity (O).
For the fraud variable (F) we consider three items of evidence. One item of evidence
represented by EPI is based on prior information known to the auditor. The second item
of evidence, EOP, depends on traditional, non-fraud-oriented audit procedures termed
‘Other Procedures’. The third, EFP, represents any fraud-speciﬁc forensic procedures per-
formed by the auditor. Each of these items of evidence provides some degree of belief
about whether the corresponding variable is present or absent.
Again, we assume that each variable takes two values; the variable is either present or
not present. For example, F represents the variable that fraud exists in the ﬁnancial state-
ments and ‘f’ represents its value that fraud is present and ‘f’ represents that fraud is not
present. As discussed earlier, according to SAS No. 99, variable F is related to the three
variables, I, D, and O through a logical ‘AND’ relationship. In other words, fraud is
present if and only if all the three factors, I, D, and O are present, i.e., f = i ^ d ^ o, or
f = i _ d _ o. These relationships are similar to the relationships considered in
the derivation of the beliefs and plausibilities for variable Z propagated from three vari-
ables A, B, and C in Fig. 1. In fact, ‘z’ is equivalent to ‘f’, and ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ are equivalent
to ‘i’, ‘d’, and ‘o’, respectively. Thus, we can write the normalized mass function propa-
gated from the three variables, I, D, and O directly from (9)–(12) as
mF IDOðff gÞ ¼ ½mþI mþDmþO þ ðr1 þ r2  r1r2ÞmþI mHDmþO þ ðr1 þ r3  r1r3ÞmHI mþDmþO
þ ðr2 þ r3  r2r3ÞmþI mþDmHO þ ðr1r2 þ r2r3 þ r1r3  2r1r2r3Þ
 ðmþI mHDmHO þ mHI mþDmHO þ mHI mHDmþOÞ=KF ; ð30Þ
mF IDOðff gÞ ¼ 1 ðmþI þ mHI ÞðmþD þ mHD ÞðmþO þ mHO Þ=KF ; ð31Þ
mF IDOðff ;f gÞ ¼ ½mHI mHDmHO þ ð1 r1Þð1 r2ÞmþI mHDmþO þ ð1 r1Þð1 r3Þ
 mHI mþDmþO þ ð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞmþI mþDmHO
þ ð1 r1r2  r2r3  r1r3 þ 2r1r2r3Þ
 ðmþI mHDmHO þ mHI mþDmHO þ mHI mHDmþOÞ=KF ; ð32Þ
where KF is given below
KF ¼ 1 ½r2 þ r1r3ð1 r2ÞmHI ðmþDmO þ mDmþOÞ  ½r3 þ r1r2ð1 r3Þ
 mHD ðmþI mO þ mI mþOÞ  ½r1 þ r2r3ð1 r1ÞmHO ðmþI mD þ mI mþDÞ
 ðr1 þ r2  r1r2ÞðmþI mDmþO þ mI mþDmOÞ  ðr2 þ r3  r2r3Þ
 ðmþI mþDmO þ mI mDmþOÞ  ðr1 þ r3  r1r3ÞðmI mþDmþO þ mþI mDmOÞ: ð33Þ
Various m-values and the interrelationships are deﬁned in Table 1.
The relationships r1, r2, and r3, respectively, represent the relationships between Incen-
tives (I) and Attitude (D), between Attitude (D) and Opportunities (O), and between
Incentive (I) and Opportunities (O). As seen in Fig. 4, the mass function at each variable,
I, D, and O, is the combination of two mass functions; one from the fraud risk factors, and
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functions:7
mþI ¼ mþTIð1 mSIÞ=KI ; mI ¼ ðmTI þ mSImHTIÞ=KI ; mHI ¼ mHTIð1 mSIÞ=KI ; ð34Þ
where KI ¼ 1 mþTImSI .
mþD ¼ mþTDð1 mSDÞ=KD; mD ¼ ðmTD þ mSDmHTDÞ=KD; mHD ¼ mHTDð1 mSDÞ=KD;
ð35Þ
where KD ¼ 1 mþTDmSD.
mþO ¼ mþTOð1 mSOÞ=KO; mO ¼ ðmTO þ mSOmHTOÞ=KO; mHO ¼ mHTOð1 mSOÞ=KO;
ð36Þ
where KO ¼ 1 mþTOmSO.
The three mass functions deﬁned at variable F due to the three items of evidence, EPI,
EOP, and EFP depicted in Fig. 4, are represented by mPI({f}), mPI({f}), mPI({f, f});
mOP({f}), mOP({f}), mOP({f,f}); and mFP({f}), mFP({f}), mFP({f,f}), respectively.
To determine the overall belief and plausibility that fraud exists, we combine the four sets
of mass functions at variable F, three directly deﬁned at F as deﬁned above by mPI, mOP,
and mFP, and the fourth denoted by mF IDO, propagated from variables I, D, and O, as
deﬁned in (30). We use again Dempster’s rule to combine the above four sets of mass func-
tions and obtain the following expressions8 for the total belief and total plausibility in
fraud (f)
BelT ðff gÞ ¼ 1 ½1 mPIðff gÞ½1 mOP ðff gÞ½1 mFP ðff gÞ½1 mF IDOðff gÞ=KT ;
ð37Þ
PlT ðff gÞ ¼ ½1 mPIðff gÞ½1 mOP ðf f gÞ½1 mFP ðff gÞ
 ½1 mF IDOðff gÞ=KT : ð38Þ
The symbol KT is given by
KT ¼
Y
i
ð1 miðff gÞÞ þ
Y
i
ð1 miðf f gÞÞ 
Y
i
miðff ;f gÞ; ð39Þ
where i 2 {PI,OP,FP,F IDO}.
The total belief that fraud exists in (37) and the total plausibility of fraud in (38) are of
interest when investigating fraud. Srivastava and Shafer [31] argue that the plausibility of
ﬁnancial statements containing serious misstatements is the appropriate measure of overall
audit risk. Similar to Srivastava and Shafer, we deﬁne the total plausibility of fraud to be
the fraud risk. Thus, the expression in (38) represents the overall fraud risk after combin-
ing all the evidence. To express the overall fraud risk formula in (38) in terms of individual7 We use Dempster’s rule to combine the two sets of mass functions, one from the threat factors denoted by mT
and the other from the safeguard factors denoted by mS. In general, we assume that fraud risk factors may
provide non-zero values for m+, m, and mH, for the corresponding variable. However, for the safeguard factors,
we assume that they yield non-zero values for only m and mH. In other words, the safeguard factors only negate
the presence of the corresponding fraud triangle factor.
8 For binary variables, Dempster’s rule can be simpliﬁed yielding directly the expressions in (37) and (38) (see
Srivastava [28] for details).
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present, we need to make the following simpliﬁcations.
We know from (31) that ½1 mF IDOðff gÞ ¼ ðmþI þ mHI ÞðmþD þ mHD ÞðmþO þ mHO Þ=KF ,
which by deﬁnition equals to PlI(i)PlA(a)PlO(o)/KF. Also, we know from (34) to (36) that
there are two items of evidence pertaining to each variable I, A, and O, and thus the plau-
sibility that each variable present is given by the product of two plausibilities that the
variable is present, one due to the threat factors and other due to the failure of safeguards.
In other words, PlI(i) = PlTI(i)PlSI(i)/KI, PlA(a) = PlTA(a)PlSA(a)/KA, and PlO(o) =
PlTO(o)PlSO(o)/KO. In addition, we know that
ð1 mPIðff gÞÞð1 mOP ðff gÞÞð1 mFP ðff gÞÞ=KT
¼ PlPIðff gÞPlOP ðff gÞPlFP ðff gÞ=KT :
Thus, using (38) and the above simpliﬁcations, we can express the fraud risk (FR) formula
in terms of the individual plausibility functions as
FR ¼ PlPIðff gÞPlOP ðff gÞPlFP ðff gÞ
KTKF
 
	 PlTIðfigÞPlSIðfigÞ
KI
 
	 PlTDðfdgÞPlSDðfdgÞ
KD
 
	 PlTOðfogÞPlSOðfogÞ
KO
 
: ð40Þ
The above expression represents the overall fraud risk given all the evidence in Fig. 4. Sri-
vastava et al. [30] discuss this risk model in detail and contrast it with a Bayesian-based
model to demonstrate the usefulness of the belief function model. We do not plan to dis-
cuss all the special cases of (40) here; rather we refer readers to Srivastava et al. [30].
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we have derived analytical formulas for the overall beliefs on a binary
variable Z resulting from beliefs on three binary variables A, B, and C that are related
to variable Z through an ‘AND’ relationship under the assumption that these three vari-
ables are interrelated. The general results are presented in Theorem 1 along with a special
case presented in Corollary 1. Several other special cases are presented to demonstrate the
importance of the results in Theorem 1.
Importantly, under the assumption that there are no interrelationships between the
three variables, A, B, and C, we show that the general formulas (see Corollary 1) reduce
to the results obtained directly from Proposition 1 of Srivastava et al. [32]. In addition, we
demonstrate applications of the general formulas in three important areas. (1) assessment
of the quality of the internal audit function by the external auditor to determine the appro-
priate level of reliance on the work of internal auditor, (2) assessment of the auditor’s inde-
pendence risk in a ﬁnancial statement audit, and (3) assessment of fraud risk in ﬁnancial
reporting.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward but computationally very cumbersome.
Basically, we want to combine seven mass functions as given in (8) and marginalize (see
Footnote 3) the resulting mass function (i.e., m-values) to variable Z. Since the combina-
tion of mass functions is known to be commutative and associative (see, e.g., Shafer [19]),
one can chose any order to combine the above mass functions. We chose the following
sequence for combining the mass functions:
mZ ABC ¼ ððððððmAB  mACÞ  mBCÞ  mZABCÞ  mAÞ#ZBC  mBÞ#ZC  mCÞ#Z : ðA:1Þ
In other words, we ﬁrst combine the two mass functions, mAB and mAC, deﬁned in (4)
and (6), respectively, and denote the resulting mass function by m1, i.e., m1 = (mAB  mAC).
Next, we combine m1 with mBC given in (5) and obtain the following mass function denoted
by m2 = (m1  mBC) = ((mAB  mAC)  mBC). In the third step, we combine m2 with
mZABC given in (7) and obtain the mass function denoted by m3 = (m2  mZABC) =
(((mAB  mAC)  mBC)  mZABC). In the fourth step, we combine m3 with mA given in
(1), and marginalize the resulting mass function to the frame of ZBC by eliminating
variable A. This process yields the following mass function denoted by m4 =
((((mAB  mAC)  mBC)  mZABC)  mA)#ZBC. Next, we combine m4 with mB given
in (2) and marginalize the resulting m-values to the frame of ZC by eliminating variable
B. This process yields the following mass function: m5 = (m4  mB)#ZC. Finally, we
combine m5 with mC given in (3) and marginalize the resulting mass function to the
frame of Z by eliminating C to obtain the desired result: mZ ABC = (m5  mC)#Z =
((((((mAB  mAC)  mBC)  mZABC)  mA)#ZBC  mB)#ZC  mC)#Z. These steps are
described below in detail.
Step 1: In this step, we want to compute m1 = (mAB  mAC), i.e., combine mAB with
mAC. This is achieved by ﬁrst extending mAB and mAC to the frame, H ABC =
{abc,abc,abc,abc,abc,abc,abc,abc}, through vacuous extension9
and then combine the two mass functions using Dempster’s rule. We obtain the following
mass function after extending mAB and mAC onto the frame HABC
mABðfab;abgÞ ¼ mABðfabc; abc;abc;abcgÞ ¼ r1;
mABðfab; ab;ab;abgÞ ¼ mABðHABCÞ ¼ 1 r1; ðA:2Þ
and
mACðfac;acgÞ ¼ mACðfabc; abc;abc;abcgÞ ¼ r3;
mACðfac; ac;ac;acgÞ ¼ mACðHABCÞ ¼ 1 r3: ðA:3Þ
By combining the above m-values, we obtain the following mass function on the frame
HABC:9 Vacuous Extension is the process through which a mass function from a smaller node (having fewer variables)
are extended to a mass function at a larger node (having a larger number of variables).
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m1ðfabc; abc;abc;abcgÞ ¼ r1ð1 r3Þ;
m1ðfabc; abc;abc;abcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þr3;
m1ðHABCÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þð1 r3Þ: ðA:4Þ
Step 2:
In this step, we combine m1 deﬁned in (A.4) with mBC again by ﬁrst extending mBC onto
the frame HABC. The vacuous extension of mBC onto HABC yields the following mass
function:
mBCðfbc;bcgÞ ¼ mBCðfabc;abc; abc;abcgÞ ¼ r2;
mBCðfbc; bc;bc;bcgÞ ¼ mBCðHABCÞ ¼ 1 r2; ðA:5Þ
The combination process of the two mass functions, one in (A.4) and the other in (A.5),
yields the following mass function on the frame HABC:
m2ðfabc;abcgÞ ¼ r1r2 þ r1r3 þ r2r3  2r1r2r3;
m2ðfabc; abc;abc;abcgÞ ¼ r1ð1 r2Þð1 r3Þ;
m2ðfabc;abc; abc;abcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þr2ð1 r3Þ;
m2ðfabc; abc;abc;abcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þr3;
m2ðHABCÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þð1 r3Þ: ðA:6Þ
Step 3:
In Step 3, we combine the mass function in (A.6) with m ZABC. This process is straight
forward because mZABC(HZABC) = 1 for HZABC = {zabc,zabc,zabc,zabc,
zabc,zabc,zabc,zabc}. Combining m2 and mZABC yields the follow-
ing mass function on the frame HZABC:
m3ðfzabc;zabcgÞ ¼ r1r2 þ r1r3 þ r2r3  2r1r2r3;
m3ðfzabc;zabc;zabc;zabcgÞ ¼ r1ð1 r2Þð1 r3Þ;
m3ðfzabc;zabc;zabc;zabcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þr2ð1 r3Þ;
m3ðfzabc;za bc;zabc;zabcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þr3;
m3ðHZABCÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þð1 r3Þ: ðA:7Þ
Step 4:
In Step 4, we combine the mass function in (A.7) with mA and marginalize the resulting
mass function to the frame HZBC = {zbc,zbc,zbc,zbc,zbc} by eliminating
variable A. Before we combine mA with m3 in (A.7), we vacuously extend mA onto the
frame HZABC as follows:
mAðfagÞ ¼ mAðfzabc;zabc;zabc;zabcgÞ ¼ mþA ;
mAðfagÞ ¼ mAðfzabc;zabc;zabc;zabcgÞ ¼ mA ;
mAðfa;agÞ ¼ mAðHZABCÞ ¼ mHA : ðA:8Þ
Since there are ﬁve non-zero belief masses for m3 in (A.7) and three non-zero belief masses
for mA in (A.8), combining the two mass functions using Dempster’s rule yields ﬁfteen be-
lief masses on the frame HZABC. However, when these ﬁfteen belief masses are marginal-
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with 12 belief masses:
m4ðfzbcgÞ ¼ ðr1r2 þ r1r3 þ r2r3  2r1r2r3ÞmþA
m4ðfzbcgÞ ¼ ðr1r2 þ r1r3 þ r2r3  2r1r2r3ÞmA ;
m4ðfzbc;zbcgÞ ¼ ðr1r2 þ r1r3 þ r2r3  2r1r2r3ÞmHA þ ð1 r1Þr2ð1 r3ÞmþA
m4ðfzbc;zbcgÞ ¼ r1ð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞmþA ;
m4ðfzbc;zbcgÞ ¼ r1ð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞmA ;
m4ðfzbc;zbcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þr3mþA ;
m4ðfzbc;zbcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þr3mA ;
m4ðfzbc;zbcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þr2ð1 r3ÞmA ;
m4ðfzbc;zbc;zbcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þr2ð1 r3ÞmHA ;
m4ðfzbc;zbc;zbc;zbcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞmA ;
m4ðfzbc;zbc;z bc;zbcgÞ
¼ ½r1ð1 r2Þð1 r3Þ þ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þr3mHA
þ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞmþA ;
m4ðfzbc;zbc;zbc;zbc;zbcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞmHA :
ðA:9Þ
Step 5:
In this step, we combine the mass function in (A.9) with mB and marginalize the result-
ing mass function to the frame HZC = {zc,zc,zc} by eliminating variable B. In order
to combine mB with m4, we vacuously extend mB onto the frame
HZBC = {zbc,zbc,zbc,zbc,zbc} as follows:
mBðfbgÞ ¼ mBðfzbc;zbc;zbcgÞ ¼ mþB ;
mBðfbgÞ ¼ mBðfzbc;zbcgÞ ¼ mB ;
mBðfb;bgÞ ¼ mBðHZBCÞ ¼ mHB : ðA:10Þ
Combining mB in (A.10) with m4 in (A.9) using Dempster’s rule
10 yields 36 belief
masses, which is the result of multiplying 12 belief masses in (A.9) with three belief masses
in (A.10). However, out of 36 belief masses, 32 are deﬁned over the frame HZBC =
{zbc,zbc,zbc,zbc,zbc} and four pertain to the empty set representing the
conﬂicts among the two mass functions denoted by m5(;). Next, we marginalize the above
32 belief masses to the frame HZC = {zc,zc,zc} by eliminating variable B. This pro-
cess yields the following mass function:
m5ðfzcgÞ ¼ ðr1r2 þ r1r3 þ r2r3  2r1r2r3ÞðmþAmþB þ mþAmHB þ mHA mþB Þ
þ ½ð1 r1Þr2ð1 r3Þ þ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þr3mþAmþB ;
m5ðfzcgÞ ¼ ðr1r2 þ r1r3 þ r2r3  2r1r2r3ÞðmAmB þ mAmHB þ mHA mB Þ
þ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þr3ðmAmB þ mAmþB þ mAmHB Þ
þ ð1 r1Þr2ð1 r3ÞðmAmB þ mþAmB þ mHA mB Þ;10 We do not re-normalize the m-values at this stage. This is done at the end after combining all the m-values.
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þ ðr1 þ r3  2r1r3Þð1 r2ÞmHA mþB þ ð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞmþAmþB ;
m5ðfzc;zcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞðmAmB þ mAmþB þ mAmHB þ mþAmB þ mHA mB Þ
þ r1ð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞmAmB þ ½r1ð1 r2Þð1 r3Þ
þ ð1 r1Þr2ð1 r3ÞmAmHB þ ½r1ð1 r2Þð1 r3Þ
þ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þr3mHA mB ;
m5ðzcÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þr3mþAmB þ ð1 r1Þr2ð1 r3ÞmAmþB ;
m5ðfzc;zcgÞ ¼ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þr3mþAmHB þ ð1 r1Þr2ð1 r3ÞmHA mþB ;
m5ðHZCÞ ¼ ½r1ð1 r2Þð1 r3Þ þ ð1 r1Þr2ð1 r3Þ
þ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þr3 þ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞmHA mHB
þ ð1 r1Þð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞðmHA mþB þ mþAmHB Þ;
m5ð;Þ ¼ ðr1 þ r2r3  r1r2r3ÞðmþAmB þ mAmþB Þ: ðA:11Þ
Step 6:
In Step 6, we combine the mass function in (A.11) with mC and marginalize the result-
ing mass function to the frame HZ = {z, z} by eliminating variable C. Here again, in
order to combine mC with m5 in (A.11), we vacuously extend mC onto the frame
HZC = {zc,zc,zc} as follows:
mCðfcgÞ ¼ mCðfzc;zcgÞ ¼ mþC ;
mcðfcgÞ ¼ mCðfzcgÞ ¼ mC ;
mcðfc;cgÞ ¼ mCðHZCÞ ¼ mHC : ðA:12Þ
Combining mC in (A.12) with m5 in (A.11) using Dempster’s rule yields 24 belief masses.
Seven out of twenty-four belief masses pertain to the empty set or the conﬂict. The mar-
ginalization process of the above 24 m-values onto the frame HZ = {z,z} by eliminating
variable C, yields the following mass function11 along with the conﬂict term denoted by
m6(;):
m6ðf;gÞ ¼ ½r2 þ r1r3ð1 r2ÞmHA ðmþBmC þ mBmþC Þ þ ½r3 þ r1r2ð1 r3ÞmHB
 ðmþAmC þ mAmþC Þ þ ½r1 þ r2r3ð1 r1ÞmHC ðmþAmB þ mAmþB Þ
þ ðr1 þ r2  r1r2ÞðmþAmBmþC þ mAmþBmC Þ þ ðr2 þ r3  r2r3Þ
 ðmþAmþBmC þ mAmBmþC Þ þ ðr1 þ r3  r1r3ÞðmAmþBmþC þ mþAmBmC Þ;
m6ðfzgÞ ¼ mþAmþBmþC þ ðr1 þ r2  r1r2ÞmþAmHB mþC þ ðr1 þ r3  r1r3ÞmHA mþBmþC
þ ðr2 þ r3  r2r3ÞmþAmþBmHC þ ðr1r2 þ r2r3 þ r1r3  2r1r2r3Þ
 ðmþAmHB mHC þ mHA mþBmHC þ mHA mHB mþC Þ;
m6ðfzgÞ ¼ 1 m6ðf;gÞ  ðmþA þ mHA ÞðmþB þ mHB ÞðmþC þ mHC Þ;11 The marginalization process yields m6ð zÞ ¼ mAmB mC þ mAmB mHC þ mA mHB mC þ mHA mBmC þ mA mHB mHCþ
mHA m

Bm
H
C þmHA mHB mC þð1 r2 r1r3þ r1r2r3ÞmHA ðmþB mC þmB mþC Þþ ð1 r3 r1r2þ r1r2r3ÞmHB ðmþA mC þmA mþC Þþ
ð1  r1  r2r3 þ r1r2r3ÞmHC ðmþA mB þ mA mþB Þ þ ð1  r1  r2 þ r1r2ÞðmþAmBmþC þ mA mþB mC Þ þ ð1  r2  r3 þ r2r3Þ
ðmþA mþB mC þ mA mBmþC Þ þ ð1 r1  r3 þ r1r3ÞðmA mþBmþC þ mþA mBmC Þ, which can be simpliﬁed with some eﬀorts to
the expression: m6ð zÞ ¼ 1 m6ðf;gÞ  ðmþA þ mHA ÞðmþB þ mHB ÞðmþC þ mHC Þ.
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þ ð1 r2Þð1 r3ÞmþAmþBmHC þ ð1 r1r2  r2r3  r1r3 þ 2r1r2r3Þ
 ðmþAmHB mHC þ mHA mþBmHC þ mHA mHB mþC Þ: ðA:13Þ
The above mass function is not normalized and represents the desired result at variable Z,
which we express as mZ ABC, the mass function propagated from the variables A, B, and
C to Z.
Appendix B. Proof of Corollary 1
By deﬁnition, the beliefs in ‘z’ and in ‘z’ are equal to m-values for ‘z’ and ‘z’, respec-
tively. These m-values can be obtained directly from Proposition 1 of Srivastava et al. [32].
Their Proposition 1 provides formulas to combine m-values propagated from sub-objec-
tives to the main objective in an ‘AND’ tree. This situation is equivalent to our situation
where Z is related to three variables, A, B, and C, through the logical ‘AND’, i.e.,
z = a ^b ^ c. Their Proposition 1 states that ‘‘The resultant m-values propagated from n
sub-objectives (Oi, i = 1,2, . . . ,n) to the main objective X in an AND-tree are given as fol-
lows (their Eqs. (1)–(3)).
mX all O’sðxÞ ¼
Yn
i¼1
moiðoiÞ;
mX all O’sðxÞ ¼ 1
Yn
i¼1
½1 moiðoiÞ;
and
mX all O’sðfx;xgÞ ¼ 1 mX allO0sðxÞ  mX all O’sðxÞ:
In the present case, we have three sub-objectives, A, B, and C, with Z being the main
objective and thus, x, is z, and oi’s are a, b, and c. The above formulas yield the following
m-values for our case:
mZ ABCðzÞ ¼ mAðaÞmBðbÞmCðcÞ ¼ mþAmþBmþC ; ðB:1Þ
mZ ABCðzÞ ¼ 1 ð1 mAðaÞÞð1 mBðbÞÞð1 mCðcÞÞ
¼ 1 ðmþA þ mHA ÞðmþB þ mHB ÞðmþC þ mHC Þ: ðB:2Þ
These m-values yield:
BelZ ABCðzÞ ¼ 1 ðmþA þ mHA ÞðmþB þ mHB ÞðmþC þ mHC Þ ðB:3Þ
BelZ ABCðzÞ ¼ mþAmþBmþC : ðB:4Þ
These are exactly the same beliefs given in Eqs. (20) and (21).
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